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Abstract 
Earnings management behavior is yet to be effectively explained as theoretical circles largely focus on accrual-
based earnings management. Cohen et al (2003) shows that with the continuous improvement of the legal 
system, US companies are more inclined to adopt real earnings management rather than accrual-based earnings 
management. As legal systems in emerging capital markets are relatively weak, thus whether the results of 
Cohen et al. can be applied in emerging markets is yet to be fully investigated. Based on the existing uneven 
development of institutional environment in China, we apply the system Generalized Method of Moments 
(GMM) to test the effect of the institutional environment on accrual-based and real earnings management in 
listed companies and explore the role of the institutional environment in the strategic choices of earnings 
management. Results show that sound institutional environment suppresses accrual-based and increases real 
earnings management in listed companies. In addition, similar to the SOX legislation in the U.S., we find that 
improvement of the institutional environment in China also has an effective governance impact on earnings 
management. 
Keywords: Institutional Environment, Accrual-based Earnings Management, Real Earnings Management, 
Earnings Management Strategy, System GMM Estimation 
 
1. Introduction 
On September 24, 2013, the first stock fraud case in China’s growth enterprise board (GEB), Wanfu 
Biotechnology (Hunan) Agricultural Development Co., Ltd. (Wanfu Biotechnology, code: 300268) was 
investigated by China's Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC)1. It has left a fraudulent blot on the 
development of the Chinese capital market, giving rise to more attention in real earnings management in listed 
companies. According to the information disclosed by the CSRC and the press, Wanfu Biotechnology 
manipulated real earnings by falsely increasing sales revenue, underestimating the cost of sales, and omitting 
expenses, among other things. Earnings management in listed companies includes accrual-based earnings 
management and real earnings management (Schipper, 1989). Accrual-based earnings management manipulates 
proceeds by changing accounting policies and accounting estimates, while real earnings management operates by 
manipulating real operating activities to deviate from the true business situation of a company. Real earnings 
management plays an important role in financial fraud in listed companies and thus has great adverse impacts on 
future firm value and performance (Altamuro et al., 2003; Cohen and Zarowin, 2010). However, theoretical 
studies largely focus on accrual-based earnings management while ignoring the role of real earnings 
management in the economy. In particular, there is still not enough understanding regarding the motivation, 
effects, and prevention of real earnings management.  
As a set of basic political, social, and legal rules to establish the production, exchange, and distribution systems, 
the institutional environment significantly impacts the operations of a company (North, 1990). Therefore, 
relative to the ownership structure, board mechanism, and information disclosure, the institutional environment 
is more fundamental to a company. With the increase of research on law and finance, many studies focus on the 
effect of the institutional environment on firm value (La porta et al., 2002; Hughes, 2009), performance (Fan et 
al., 2007; Agrawal, 2013), financing (Sapienza, 2004; Dinc, 2005), investment (Johnson et al., 2002; Mclean et 
al., 2012), stock price (Beny, 2007; Ding et al., 2007), internal control (Goh, 2009; Gong et al., 2012), etc., while 
few directly investigate its effect on earnings management. Some studies focus on how the legal environment 
and shareholder protection impact earnings management (Leuz et al., 2003; Ball et al., 2008; Francis and Wang, 
2008), but there is little evidence on the effect of the institutional environment on real earnings management. 
Cohen et al. (2008) find that U.S. firms are more likely to choose real earnings management following the 
enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX). With the improvement of legislation and investor protection in 
China, the issue of new accounting standards also brings China’s accounting system more in line with 
international conventions and restricts accrual-based earnings management. Although China lacks legislation 
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similar to SOX in the U.S., it would be interesting to test whether listed companies in the emerging capital 
markets, such as China, prefer real earnings management. 
The significant variation in the institutional environment across regions in China provides us with an opportunity 
to conduct empirical research. In this study, the sample consists of 700 companies listed on the Shanghai and 
Shenzhen stock exchanges from 2002 through 2013, and we employ the dynamic panel data methodology. To 
measure accrual-based earnings management, we apply the Healy model (Healy, 1985), the DeAngelo model 
(DeAngelo, 1986), the Jones model (Jones, 1991), and the cross-sectional modified Jones model (Dechow et al., 
1995). We follow Roychowdhury (2006) to estimate real earnings management. The effects of the institutional 
environment on accrual-based and real earnings management is examined by using the system generalized 
method of moments (GMM) estimation. 
This paper contributes to the literature in the following ways. First, it introduces a methodology to mitigate the 
endogeneity problem in institutional environment research. Most studies on institutional environment ignore the 
endogeneity problem while only a few studies use lagged institutional environment as an instrumental variable to 
overcome this problem. However, there are some limitations in this method. On the one hand, as the institutional 
environment is relatively stable over time2, lagged variables are also likely to be endogenous. On the other hand, 
the endogeneity problem in institutional environment research arises mainly from the omitted variable bias rather 
than the reverse causality running from the dependent variable to the independent variable3. Therefore, 
controlling for lagged independent variables cannot solve the omitted variable bias. This paper introduces system 
GMM estimation to effectively overcome the endogeneity problem, and it also provides an effective test method 
for future investigation. Second, based on the existence of uneven development across China, the study borrows 
international comparisons from the literature on law and finance and compares regional differences in China. 
Analyzing the impact of the institutional environment, such as government intervention and legislation level, on 
the two earnings management methods in listed companies clarifies the mechanism of the institutional 
environment with regard to earnings management. It also enriches the empirical evidence on law and finance and 
earnings management issues in a country that undergoes economic transition, which provides a reference for 
relevant regulatory authorities. Third, with the gradual improvement of the institutional environment, we find 
that firms prefer to use real earnings management rather than accrual-based earnings management. This is 
consistent with the findings of Cohen et al. (2008), suggesting that the improvement in the institutional 
environment in China has similar effects on the earnings management selection of listed companies as the U.S. 
SOX legislation. This study also adds to the understanding of earnings management in emerging economies. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section two, we demonstrate the research background and 
hypothesis development; section three introduces the methodology; section four describes the model and 
estimation method, while section five touches on the method selection; section six displays empirical results and 
analyses; and finally, section five concludes and discusses policy implications. 
2. Literature review and hypothesis development  
2.1 Literature review  
Based on whether it affects cash flows, Schipper (1989) argues that earnings management can be achieved by 
either manipulating accruals or real business activities. A large number of studies also affirm that accrual-based 
and real earnings management are the two methods of earnings management in publicly traded companies 
(Graham et al., 2005; Cohen et al., 2008; Zang, 2012), which sheds some light on earnings management 
research. Real earnings management changes the nature of corporate business activities and the changed 
businesses are confirmed, measured, and reported according to accounting principles. This operation does not 
violate generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) and it is well hidden. Graham et al. (2005) find that 
firms intend to manipulate earnings through real business activities, and in order to achieve the profit 
expectations, 80% of interviewed CFOs would reduce R&D, advertisement, and maintenance costs, and 55% 
would defer new projects. The current concerns of accrual-based and real earnings management research include 
the following. First, the research concerns the economic consequences of earnings management. Bhojraj et al. 
(2009) argue that relative to the firms without earnings management, those who employ either accrual-based or 
real earnings management to satisfy analysts' expectations always have poor operating and stock market 
performance. Moreover, Kim et al. (2010) find that for external investors, real earnings management has more 
information uncertainty than accrual-based management. Thus, it has adverse impacts on future cash flows and 
even the long-term performance of a company. However, Gunny (2010) proposes a contrary argument 
suggesting that, to achieve the earnings expectation, firms that use real earnings management will in three years’ 
time perform better than those that do not. Second, the sequential character of earnings management is a 
concern. A great number of studies hypothesize that managers choose earnings management without considering 
the sequential issue. Graham et al. (2005) point out that real earnings management exists over the whole fiscal 
year while accrual-based earnings management only happens between the end of the fiscal year and the annual 
report disclosure. The findings of Matsuura (2008) also show the timing selection of these two earnings 
management methods. However, Badertscher (2011) finds managers initially use accrual-based earnings 
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management followed by real earnings management instead of using non-GAAP earnings management as the 
final remedy. Third, the research concerns the choices of earnings management. Some studies find that corporate 
earnings management changes from accrual-based to real earnings management and managers are more likely to 
choose real earnings management to manipulate earnings (Graham et al., 2005; Roychowdhury, 2006). Some 
findings also show that managers weigh the accrual-based and real earnings management based on their relative 
costs (Badertscher, 2011; Coehn and Zarowin, 2012; Zang, 2012). 
2.2 Hypothesis development 
North (1990) argues that the institutional environment is a set of basic political, social, and legal rules to 
establish a production, exchange, and distribution system. It constitutes the incentive mechanism for human 
beings’ political or economic transactions. Different institutions lead to different transaction costs and thus affect 
operating decisions. Since the late 1970s, China has been transitioning from a planned to a market economy, and 
the process of marketization has achieved great successes. In the current stage, the institutional environment in 
China has two distinctive features. First, during the process of economic transformation, the central government 
implemented an uneven development strategy of developing coastal and eastern areas first, followed by inland 
areas and the west. This strategy resulted in significantly different institutional environments across the country. 
In addition, the varying speeds of economic development exerted varying impacts on the institutional 
environment across different regions. Under these circumstances, both regional differences and developments in 
the institutional environment have had a great influence on listed companies’ earnings management strategies. 
The existing literature offers no clear evidence regarding whether these influences exhibit any pattern, and 
further investigation is needed. 
Extant studies mainly focus on government intervention and legislation level, and examine the effect of the 
institutional environment on accrual-based earnings management. With respect to the institutional environment, 
Makar and Alam (1989) find that government intervention impacts a company’s earnings management behavior, 
and earnings management is used to avoid risks from political costs. However, Bushman et al. (2004) argue that 
the influence of government intervention is not clear. In one respect, based on the political cost hypothesis, the 
government may have predatory incentives to make firms hide real financial information, thus government 
intervention and earnings management are positively related. However, based on the rational economic man 
hypothesis, the government would require firms to disclose real accounting information; therefore, the 
relationship between government intervention and earnings management becomes negative. During this special 
period of economic transition, the Chinese government plays an important role in allocating market resources. 
To capture the resources of capital markets, local governments take part in earnings management decisions in 
listed companies by actively offering tax preferences and financial subsidies. Chen et al. (2008) argue that local 
governments in China play a significant role in earnings management in listed companies and find evidence that 
local governments assist listed companies in accrual-based earnings management, which is consistent with the 
findings of Li et al. (2012).  
In terms of legislation level, Che and Qian (1998), through international comparisons, find that it is common in 
developing countries with relatively lower legislation levels to disguise profits. Defond and Huang (2004) argue 
that the extent of accrual-based earnings management decreases as the enforcement of the existing laws on 
investor protection strengthens. Furthermore, Leuz et al. (2003) propose that the legislation level of a country 
greatly influences the quality of the financial reports of a company, and the improvement in investor protection 
and legislation restricts accrual-based earnings management, consistent with the findings of Lang et al. (2006) 
and Francis and Wang (2008). These factors all lead to a negative relationship between the institutional 
environment and accrual-based earnings management. Therefore, we form the following hypotheses. 
Hypothesis 1: Institutional environment is positively associated with the magnitude of accrual-based earnings 
management in Chinese listed firms.  
Hypothesis 1a: Government intervention is positively associated with the magnitude of accrual-based earnings 
management in Chinese listed firms.  
Hypothesis 1b: Legislation level is positively associated with the magnitude of accrual-based earnings 
management in Chinese listed firms. 
Development of the research on real earnings management started relatively late as it is a new way to manipulate 
earnings. As a result, there is little research on the influence of the institutional environment on real earnings 
management. Ewert and Wagenhofer (2005) show through a theoretical model that accrual-based earnings 
management decreases and real earnings management increases with tightened accounting standards and/or 
strengthened legislation. Chi et al. (2011) argue that firms are more likely to choose real earnings management 
when they are suffering higher litigation risks and stricter external audits since real earnings management is not 
illegal under the conditions for satisfying information disclosure principles. Zang (2012) also suggests that 
tougher enforcement of external supervision leads to more real earnings management.  
The earnings management strategy of listed companies is mainly decided based on two types of earnings 
management costs: namely, operating costs and fines imposed by regulators. Relative to the accrual-based 
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earnings management by changing accounting policies and accounting estimates, real earnings management by 
manipulating real operating activities incurs higher costs. The institutional environment in China has, however, 
seen improvement in recent years under the government’s watch, and with the legislative improvement on 
investor protection, the enhancement of market surveillance, and reduced manipulability of accounting 
standards, accrual-based earnings management is more likely to be detected by regulators. Real earnings 
management, which is based on actual business activities, is more concealed, and thus more difficult for 
regulators to detect. It is obvious that real earnings management is less likely to be investigated and punished by 
regulators than accrual-based earnings management. As the cost of penalties is a product of the probability of an 
offense being punished and the amount of the fine imposed, and because the specified penal code for earnings 
management offenses in China does not differentiate between the types of earnings management, the costs of 
punishment for real earnings management are much lower than those for accrual-based earnings management. 
Therefore, the level of real earnings management is higher in regions with a better institutional environment, i.e., 
an improved institutional environment leads to greater real earnings management in listed companies. With the 
improvement of the institutional environment, the strategy of earnings management in listed companies has 
shifted from the easy-to-detect accrual-based earning management to the currently hard-to-detect real earnings 
management. 
Hypothesis 2: Institutional environment is negatively associated with the magnitude of real earnings 
management in Chinese listed firms.  
Hypothesis 2a: Government intervention is negatively associated with real earnings management in Chinese 
listed firms. 
Hypothesis 2b: Legislation level is negatively associated with the magnitude of real earnings management in 
Chinese listed firms. 
Hypothesis 3: With the improvement of the institutional environment, the strategy of earnings management in 
listed companies changes from accrual-based to real earnings management. 
3. Sample and research design  
3.1 Sample  
The sample consists of all A-shares companies listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges in the 
period 2002–2013, and the following requirements are employed to ensure the accuracy of results. First, we 
exclude ST (Special Treatment firms: the firm is labeled as an ST firm by the stock exchanges in accordance 
with certain guidelines put forward by China’s securities regulatory authority when it falls into serious financial 
problems) and PT (Particular Transfer firms: firms downgraded from ST status due to continuous losses for one 
more year; this level entails a virtual suspension of trading of the particular downgraded firm’s shares as well as 
a significant danger of de-listing) companies. Second, we remove listed financial companies. Third, we remove 
listed firms with missing financial data. After sifting, the final dynamic panel data consists of 700 listed 
companies, over a 12-year period (2002–2013) with 8,400 firm-year observations. All the financial and 
governance data are obtained from the CSMAR and RESSET databases. Institutional environment data are from 
the “NERI INDEX of Marketization of China’s Provinces (2011) Report” (marketization report) by Fan et al. 
(2011). 
3.2 Variable definitions and measurement 
3.2.1 Dependent variables 
Accrual-based earnings management: The accrual method measures non-discretionary accruals by 
dividing the estimated total accruals by regression into discretionary and non-discretionary accruals and 
uses discretionary accruals as a proxy for earnings management. This method is widely accepted by 
academics. Stubben (2010) finds that among the top international accounting journals, The Accounting 
Review, the Journal of Accounting and Economics, and the Journal of Accounting Research, more than 
40 papers used the accrual method to identify earnings management during the period between 2005 
and 2008. This method includes four models as follows: 
(a) Healy model (Healy, 1985) 
1
1 T
it it
t
NDA TA
T
=
= ∑                                                               (1) 
Where: NDA is non-discretionary accruals; TA is total accruals (the difference between net profits and net 
operating cash flows); t=1, 2 … T; and i stands for various firms. 
(b) DeAngelo model (DeAngelo, 1986) 
, 1it i tNDA TA −=                                                                  (2) 
(c) Jones model (Jones, 1991) 
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1 2 3
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NDA REV PPE
A A A A
α α α
− − − −
∆
= + +
                                        (3) 
Where: REV∆ is the change in revenues; PPE is gross property (plant and equipment); and A is total accruals. 
(d) Modified Jones model 
1 2 3
, 1 , 1 , 1 , 1
1it it it it
i t i t i t i t
NDA REV REC PPE
A A A A
α α α
− − − −
∆ − ∆
= + +
                           (4) 
Where: REC∆ is the change in accounts receivable. 
As a large number of empirical research studies use the modified Jones model with cross-sectional data, the 
resulting cross-sectional modified Jones model has gradually become the main method for measuring earnings 
management (Dechow et al., 1995). Coefficients for different years and different sectors can be estimated as this 
model is regressed by year and by sector. Finally, the level of earnings management can be obtained. 
Real earnings management: The main means of real earnings management include: sales manipulation 
(Roychowdhury, 2006), production manipulation (Roychowdhury, 2006), discretionary expenditure 
manipulation (Roychowdhury, 2006), asset sales (Edelstein et al., 2008; Zang, 2012), and stock repurchase 
(Hribar et al., 2006). Based on the sales, production, and discretionary expenditure manipulation, Roychowdhury 
(2006) first established the real earnings management model, creating a way to measure real earnings 
management. It is held in high esteem by Taylor and Xu (2010), Zhao et al. (2012), and other academics and is 
the most authoritative real earnings management model. This paper follows Roychowdhury to measure annual 
abnormal cash flow from operations, cost of production, and discretionary expense4, and establish a total real 
earning management model to estimate the level of real earnings management. 
(e) Cash flow from operations estimation model 
1 2 3
, 1 , 1 , 1 , 1
1
+it it it it
i t i t i t i t
CFO Sales Sales
A A A A
α α α ε
− − − −
∆
= + +
                                     (5) 
Where: CFO is cash flow from operations; Sales∆  is change in sales; and A is total assets. By regressing 
model (5), we can obtain the expected CFO for each firm in our sample and the abnormal CFO (REM_CFO) is 
the difference between actual and expected CFO. 
(f) Production costs estimation model 
, -1
1 2 3 3
, 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1
1
+ +i tit it it it
i t i t i t i t i t
SalesPROD Sales Sales
A A A A A
α α α α ε
− − − − −
∆∆
= + +
                            
(6) 
Where: PROD is production costs, defined as the cost of goods sold plus the change in inventory. The expected 
costs of production can be estimated from model (6) and the abnormal production costs (REM_PROD) equal the 
difference between actual and expected production costs5. 
(g) Discretionary expense estimation model6 
, -1
1 2
, 1 , 1 , 1
1
+i tit it
i t i t i t
SalesDISEXP
A A A
α α ε
− − −
= +                                                 (7) 
Where: DISEXP is discretionary expenses, calculated as the sum of sales expenses and management expenses. 
The expected discretionary expenses can be measured by regressing model (7), and the abnormal discretionary 
expenses (REM_DISEXP) are the difference between actual and expected discretionary expenses7. 
(h) Total real earnings management model 
Given that Roychowdhury’s three measures of real earnings management have an inconsistent influence on 
normal cash flows, to avoid the resulting adverse effects and obtain the overall effects of real earnings 
management, this paper establishes a total earnings management model to estimate the level of real earnings 
management. Total real earnings management (REM_PROXY) can be obtained by abnormal production costs 
(REM_PROD) minus the sum of abnormal cash flow from operations (REM_CFO) and abnormal discretionary 
expenses (REM_DISEXP). Model (8) is as follows: 
_ = _ - _ - _it it it itREM PROXY REM PROD REM CFO REM DISEXP                           (8) 
3.2.2 Explanatory variables 
Institutional environment: In this paper, it consists of two proxies, government intervention and legislation level. 
Specifically, we use the “relationship between government and market” index in the marketization report as a 
proxy for government intervention (Gov). It is a negative indicator, i.e., the level of government intervention is 
lower for a stronger relationship between government and market. The “service level of agencies (lawyers and 
accountants)” index in the marketization report is used as a proxy for legislation level (Law). It is a positive 
indicator, i.e., the legislation level is higher for a higher service level of agencies. 
3.2.3 Control variables 
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The control variables consist of variables reflecting the features of a firm’s characteristics and governance that 
may impact corporate earnings management. In terms of characteristics of a firm, McNichols (2000) argues that 
larger firms always have better corporate governance mechanisms, and thus better restrain earnings management. 
Chung et al. (2005) find that agency costs resulting from substantial free cash flows lead to managers’ earnings 
management. In terms of corporate governance, Cornett et al. (2009) find that small-scale boards of directors 
monitor and restrain earnings management more effectively. Klein (2002), Benke (2006), and Petra (2007) find 
that an independent director plays an important role in constraining earnings management. Firth et al. (2007) also 
find some empirical evidence that the introduction of a board of supervisors provides effective restriction on 
earnings management. Moreover, Chin et al. (2009) present that firms with higher ownership concentrations are 
more likely to experience earnings manipulation. The definitions of each variable are shown in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Variable definitions and measures 
Types Variables Symbols Definitions and measurement 
Dependent 
variables 
Accrual-based 
earnings 
management 
AEM Accrual-based earnings management 
AEM_Healy The absolute value of AEM from the Healy model 
AEM_DeAngelo The absolute value of AEM from the DeAngelo model 
AEM_Jones The absolute value of AEM from the Jones model 
AEM_CMJones The absolute value of AEM from the cross-sectional 
modified Jones model  
Real earnings 
management 
REM Real earnings management 
REM_PROXY The REM from the total real earnings management 
model  
REM_CFO The REM by sales manipulation from cash flow from the operations estimation model  
REM_PROD The REM by production manipulation from the production costs estimation model 
REM_DISEXP The REM by expenditure manipulation from the discretionary expense estimation model  
Explanatory 
variables 
Government 
intervention Gov 
“The relationship between government and market” 
index in the marketization report, a negative indicator 
Legislation Law 
“The service level of agencies (lawyers and 
accountants)” index in the marketization report, a 
positive indicator 
Control 
variables 
Firm size Size Natural logarithm of total assets 
Agency costs Age Management expenses/total assets 
Cash flow from 
operations CFO Net cash flow from operations/total assets 
Board of directors’ 
size BDS Natural logarithm of the number of directors  
Percentage of 
independent 
directors 
PID The ratio of the number of independent directors to all directors 
Board of 
supervisors’ size BSS Natural logarithm of the number of supervisors 
Ownership 
concentration H1 The ownership of the largest shareholder 
 
4. Model and estimation method 
We establish model (10) to examine the impact of institutional environment on accrual-based earnings 
management. Here, we use the lagged AEM as an independent variable for two reasons. First, since earlier 
earnings management greatly impacts later earnings management8, introducing a lagged variable will reduce 
biases from an omitted variable. Second, earnings management methods, such as changing accounting policies 
and accounting estimates or manipulating real activities, are continuous and cumulative. The inertia feature of 
earnings management can be found by adding this lagged variable. The model is as follows. 
0 1 , 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
8 9
=
            1 + +                                               
it i t it it it it it it
it it it it
AEM AEM Gov Law Size Age CFO BDS
PID H
α α α α α α α α
α α µ ξ
−
+ + + + + + +
+ +
          (10) 
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Where: AEM is accrual-based earnings management, which consists of AEM_Healyit, AEM_DeAngeloit, 
AEM_Jonesit, and AEM_CMjonesit; AEMi,t-1 is one-period lagged accrual-based earnings management; ìit is 
unobservable individual effect that is used to control for the omitted characteristic variables; and îit is a 
disturbance term. There are no sector and year dummy variables in this model as they are controlled when 
measuring earnings management. Introducing these dummies into model (10) will result in a significant 
deviation. According to hypothesis 1, the coefficients 2α  and 3α  on Govit and Lawit should be negative, which 
suggests a negative relationship between institutional environment and accrual-based earnings management. 
In order to test the impact of institutional environment on real earnings management, model (11) is established as 
follows. 
0 1 , 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
8 9
=
            1 + +                                               
it i t it it it it it it
it it it it
REM REM Gov Law Size Age CFO BDS
PID H
α α α α α α α α
α α µ ξ
−
+ + + + + + +
+ +
            (11) 
Where: REMit, is real earnings management, which consists of: REM_PROXY it, REM_CFO it, REM_PROD it, and 
REM_DISEXP
 it; and REMi,t-1 is one-period lagged real earnings management. According to hypothesis 2, the 
coefficients β2 and β3 on Govit and Lawit should be positive, which suggests a positive relationship between 
institutional environment and real earnings management. 
The following model (12) is constructed for examining the strategic transformation of earnings management in 
Chinese listed companies. 
0 1 , 1 , 1 2 3 4 5
6 7 8 9 10
= ( )
                            1 + +      
it it i t i t it it it it
it it it it it it it
REM AEM REM AEM Gov Law Size Age
CFO BDS IND BSS H
γ γ γ γ γ γ
γ γ γ γ γ µ ξ
− −
− + − + + + +
+ + + + +
       (12)  
Where: REMit—AEMit is the difference between real and accrual-based earnings management, and a larger 
difference means a preference of listed companies for real earnings management. For the ease of calculation, 
REMit is used as the total real earnings management, REM_PROXYit, instead of the other three indicators. AEMit 
consists of four measures of accrual-based earnings management: AEM_Healyit, AEM_DeAngeloit, AEM_Jonesit, 
and AEM_CMJonesit. According to hypothesis 3, the coefficients γ2 and γ3 should be positive, which suggests a 
positive relationship between institutional environment and the difference between the two types of earnings 
management, i.e., the difference between real and accrual-based earnings management is larger when the 
institutional environment is better. It suggests that with the improvement of the institutional environment, the 
hard-to-detect real earnings management is more preferable than accrual-based earnings management in listed 
companies. 
5. Method selection 
Our sample consists of 700 cross-sectional units (N=700) and 12 units of time series (T=12), which is consistent 
with the feature of “large N and small T” in Roodman (2005). As lagged dependent variables are used as an 
independent variable in this model, the estimates would be biased and inconsistent if we used OLS, random 
effect, or fixed effect to test this model. Therefore, we apply dynamic panel GMM estimation. As difference 
GMM is prone to biases with a finite sample, most researchers employ system GMM to avoid biases from weak 
instrumental variables so as to obtain unbiased and consistent results. Furthermore, with a finite sample, the 
standard deviation of two-step system GMM estimates is seriously biased downward (Bond, 2001). Although the 
finite-sample correction presented by Windmeijer (2005) can be used for reducing this bias, it also makes the 
asymptotic distribution approximations less reliable. Therefore, one-step system GMM is widely preferred in 
empirical research. Thus, we use the one-step system GMM in this paper. 
6. Empirical results and analysis 
6.1 Summary statistics 
Table 2 reports the summary statistics of the variables used in the model. The average of government 
intervention is 8.375 and legislation level is 5.292. It can be seen from the minimum and maximum values and 
standard deviations that both of them show significant regional differences. Due to various reasons such as 
resource endowments, geographic positions, history, and culture, the marketization reform in China, the existing 
policies lead to the regional differences in the transition from a planned to a market economy. This imbalance in 
growth strategy results in distinctive regional features in privileged areas. For instance, there is an unbalanced 
institutional environment across China where east is superior, followed by the central and western regions, which 
are near the bottom. 
 
Table 2. Summary statistics 
 Variables Mean Median S.D. Min. Max. 
Independent variables 
AEM_Healy 0.081 0.050 0.104 0.000 1.482 
AEM_DeAngelo 0.061 0.040 0.074 0.000 0.852 
AEM_Jones 0.076 0.048 0.094 0.000 0.966 
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AEM_CMJones 0.076 0.048 0.095 0.000 1.194 
REM_PROXY 0.007 0.005 0.786 -1.545 1.132 
REM_CFO 
-0.005 -0.001 0.112 -1.109 0.943 
REM_PROD 0.001 -0.006 0.774 -1.065 1.211 
REM_DISEXP 
-0.001 -0.014 0.073 -0.533 1.607 
Explanatory variables Gov 8.375 8.670 1.565 -4.660 10.530 
Law 5.292 5.450 2.757 -12.270 10.940 
Control variables 
Size 21.704 21.574 1.095 18.147 26.660 
Age 0.065 0.033 0.105 0.001 0.723 
CFO 
-0.039 -0.003 0.336 -1.415 1.695 
BDS 2.460 2.485 0.398 0.000 3.807 
PID 0.304 0.300 0.105 0.000 1.000 
BSS 1.607 1.609 0.490 0.000 2.944 
H1 0.176 0.132 0.141 0.000 0.726 
 
6.2 Correlations 
Table 3 shows Pearson and Spearman correlations between variables. AEM represents the AEM_CMJones from 
the cross-sectional modified Jones model and REM is the REM_PROXY from the total earnings management 
model. The correlations between four accrual-based earnings management measures and four real earnings 
management measures are not reported in this paper due to space constraints. As can be seen from Table 3, all 
the correlations satisfy the multicollinearity criterion except that both the Pearson and Spearman correlations 
between government intervention and legislation are larger than 0.6 (0.645 and 0.673, respectively). This 
indicates the existence of multicollinearity. In order to avoid the influence of multicollinearity on regression, we 
separately regress the government intervention and legislation variables. 
 
Table 3. Correlation matrix 
Variables AEM REM Gov Law Size Age CFO BDS PID BSS H1 
AEM 1.000 0.014 -0.018*** -0.011*** -0.031*** -0.002 -0.030*** 0.027** -0.01 0.013 0.024** 
REM 0.019* 1.000 0.015** 0.019*** -0.056** 0.025** -0.008 0.031*** 0.013 0.003 -0.027** 
Gov -0.011*** 0.049*** 1.000 0.645*** 0.106*** 0.053*** -0.029** 0.064*** 0.061*** -0.004 -0.030*** 
Law -0.002*** 0.070*** 0.673*** 1.000 0.112*** 0.062*** -0.023** 0.126*** 0.131*** 0.039*** -0.030*** 
Size -0.023** 0.020* 0.107*** 0.121*** 1.000 -0.163*** 0.034*** 0.096*** 0.116*** 0.045*** 0.047*** 
Age 0.018 -0.028** 0.040*** 0.071*** -0.419*** 1.000 0.134*** 0.050*** 0.034*** 0.046*** 0.065*** 
CFO -0.044*** -0.009 -0.053*** -0.041*** 0.026** -0.029*** 1.000 -0.031*** 0.000 0.003 0.016 
BDS 0.014 0.032*** 0.059*** 0.109*** 0.084*** 0.040*** 0.001 1.000 -0.201*** 0.456*** -0.128*** 
PID -0.003 0.050*** 0.086*** 0.116*** 0.116*** 0.050*** 0.000 -0.171*** 1.000 -0.068*** -0.058*** 
BSS 0.014 0.005 -0.014 0.029** 0.042*** 0.053*** 0.005 0.419*** -0.072*** 1.000 -0.086*** 
H1 -0.011 -0.018 0.030*** -0.040*** 0.026** -0.038*** 0.062*** -0.119*** -0.053*** -0.070*** 1.000 
Notes: This table reports the Pearson correlations above the diagonal and Spearman correlations below. ***, **, 
and * represent the significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Two-tailed test. 
 
6.3 Univariate test 
To test the impact of institutional environment on earnings management, we conduct a univariate analysis for 
both accrual-based and real earnings management by using the t-test for averages and the Wilcoxon rank-sum 
test for medians. We divide our sample into high-level and low-level groups by the average government 
intervention index in each year from 2002 to 2013. Those with a lower-than-average intervention index are 
regarded as part of the high-intervention group; otherwise, they are part of the low-intervention group. For 
instance, the average government intervention index in 2002 is 6.601. With an intervention index lower than 
6.601, 334 observations are assigned to high-intervention group, and with an intervention index higher than 
6.601, 366 are assigned to the low-intervention group. It is worth noting that this paper does not follow Wei and 
Liu (2007) in using total sample average as a cut-off point as it ignores the time-varying character of institutional 
environment, since, as time passes, institutional environment improves. Most observations in earlier years are 
assigned to the high-level group, and more recent ones to the low-level group, which may result in biases. 
Similarly, based on the average legislation index in each year, from 2002 to 2013, our sample is divided into low 
and high legislation groups. 
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Table 4 reports the differences of accrual-based earnings management between government intervention groups 
and between legislation groups using the t-test and the Wilcoxon rank-sum test. Taking AEM-Healy for instance, 
the difference of average accrual-based earnings management between high and low government intervention 
groups is 0.011, which is significant at the one percent (1%) level in the t-test. The difference of medians is 
0.002, which is significant at the five percent (5%) level in the Wilcoxon rank-sum test. It suggests that with a 
higher government intervention level, the extent of accrual-based earnings management in listed companies is 
higher, which is consistent with our hypothesis 1a. The differences of averages and medians between the low and 
high legislation level groups are 0.013 and 0.001, respectively, and both are significant at the five percent (5%) 
level in the t-test and the Wilcoxon rank-sum test. This indicates that with a lower legislation level, the extent of 
accrual-based earnings management in listed companies is higher, which is consistent with our hypothesis 1b. It 
demonstrates that the extent of accrual-based earnings management is lower in firms with a better institutional 
environment. Difference tests are also applied for the accrual-based earnings management measured by the 
DeAngelo model, the Jones model, and the cross-sectional modified Jones model, and the results are consistent 
with this conclusion, which provides supportive evidence for hypothesis 1. 
 
Table 4. Difference tests of accrual-based earnings management sub-samples 
Panel A: Government intervention and accrual-based earnings management 
Variables 
High intervention Low intervention T-test Wilcoxon rank-sum test 
Mean Median Mean Median Difference 
of mean T value 
Difference 
of median Z value 
AEM_Healy 0.086 0.051 0.075 0.049 0.011 4.700*** 0.002 2.545** 
AEM_DeAngelo 0.064 0.041 0.058 0.039 0.006 3.907*** 0.002 1.847* 
AEM_Jones 0.079 0.049 0.072 0.047 0.007 3.499*** 0.002 2.194** 
AEM_MSJones 0.079 0.048 0.072 0.046 0.007 3.197*** 0.002 1.388 
Panel B: Legislation and accrual-based earnings management 
Variables 
Low legislation High legislation T-test Wilcoxon rank-sum test 
Mean Median Mean Median Difference 
of mean T value 
Difference 
of median Z value 
AEM_Healy 0.089 0.050 0.076 0.051 0.013 5.513*** 0.001 2.725*** 
AEM_DeAngelo 0.064 0.040 0.059 0.039 0.006 3.214*** 0.001 1.646* 
AEM_Jones 0.079 0.048 0.074 0.047 0.005 2.498** 0.001 1.860* 
AEM_MSJones 0.079 0.048 0.074 0.047 0.005 2.241** 0.001 0.084 
Notes: This table reports the difference of accrual-based earnings management between high and low 
intervention sub-samples in panel A and between low and high legislation sub-samples in panel B. Our sample is 
divided into two sub-samples by the mean values of government intervention and legislation level. AEM 
represents accrual-based earnings management. AEM_Healy, AEM_DeAngelo, AEM_Jones, and AEM_CMJones 
are the absolute value of AEM from the Healy, DeAngelo, Jones, and cross-sectional modified Jones models, 
respectively. ***, **, and * represent the significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Two-tailed 
test. 
 
Table 5 demonstrates differences of real earnings management between two government intervention groups and 
between two legislation groups by using the t-test and the Wilcoxon rank-sum test. Taking REM_PROXY for 
example, the differences of average and median real earnings management between the high and low 
government intervention groups are -0.01 and -0.011. Both are significant at the one percent (1%) level in the t-
test and the Wilcoxon rank-sum test. This means that the extent of real earnings management is higher in listed 
companies located in regions with lower government intervention, which is consistent with hypothesis 2a. For 
the low and high legislation groups, the difference of means and medians are -0.029 and -0.011, respectively, 
and both are significant at the one percent (1%) level in both tests, indicating that with a higher legislation level, 
the extent of real earnings management is higher as well. This is consistent with hypothesis 2b. In summary, 
observations with a better institutional environment suffer higher levels of real earnings management. This paper 
also tests three other measures of real earnings management, REM_CFO, REM_PROD, and REM_DISEXP, and 
the results are also consistent with hypothesis 2. 
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Table 5. Difference tests of real earnings management sub-samples 
Panel A: Government intervention and real earnings management 
Variables 
High intervention Low intervention T-test Wilcoxon rank-sum test 
Mean Median Mean Median Difference 
of mean  T value  
Difference 
of median Z value 
REM_PROXY 0.001 -0.010 0.011 0.001 -0.010 -6.410*** -0.011 -6.184*** 
REM_CFO -0.002 0.003 -0.007 -0.002 0.005 1.968** 0.005 3.056*** 
REM_PROD -0.001 -0.009 0.002 -0.003 -0.003 -0.090 -0.006 -5.040*** 
REM_DISEXP 0.001 -0.012 -0.003 -0.016 0.004 2.310** 0.004 3.598*** 
Panel B: Legislation and real earnings management 
Variables 
Low legislation High legislation T-test Wilcoxon rank-sum test 
Mean Median Mean Median Difference 
of mean  T value  
Difference 
of median Z value 
REM_PROXY -0.026 0.001 0.003 0.012 -0.029 -5.184*** -0.011 -6.355*** 
REM_CFO -0.003 0.002 -0.007 -0.005 0.004 1.681* 0.007 4.495*** 
REM_PROD 0.000 0.003 0.001 0.007 -0.001 -0.121 -0.004 -3.798*** 
REM_DISEXP 0.000 -0.013 -0.003 -0.016 0.003 2.246** 0.003 3.324*** 
Notes: This table reports the difference of real earnings management between high and low intervention sub-
samples in panel A and between low and high legislation sub-samples in panel B. Our sample is divided into two 
sub-samples by the mean values of government intervention and legislation level. REM represents real earnings 
management. REM_PROXY, REM_CFO, REM_PROD, and REM_DISEXP are the REM from the total real 
earnings management model, the cash flow from operations estimation model, the production costs estimation 
model, and the discretionary expense estimation model, respectively. ***, **, and * represent the significance at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Two-tailed test. 
 
6.4 Institutional environment vs. accrual-based earnings management 
Table 6 reports the one-step system GMM estimates of model (10), which displays the relationship between 
institutional environment and accrual-based earnings management. To alleviate multicollinearity between the 
two proxies for institutional environment, only one of them is included in model (10) at a time. Taking the 
accrual-based earnings management measured by the cross-sectional modified Jones model as an explanatory 
variable as an example, the relationship between government intervention and accrual-based earnings 
management (AEM_CMJones) is significantly positive at the one percent (1%) level. As government 
intervention is a negative indicator, this result means that the extent of accrual-based earnings management is 
higher in firms facing stronger government intervention, which is consistent with hypothesis 1a. Legislation 
level also has a significant negative relationship with accrual-based earnings management (AEM_CMJones) at 
the one percent (1%) level. However, as legislation level is a positive indicator, it means that the extent of 
accrual-based earnings management in firms located in regions with a lower legislation level is higher, which 
supports hypothesis 1b. In summary, the relationship between institutional environment and accrual-based 
earnings management is significantly negative, i.e., in regions with a better institutional environment the local 
firms have less accrual-based earnings management. This indicates that the claim of Leuz et al. (2006) also 
applies to China’s capital market, and it is consistent with hypothesis 1. This paper also uses three other 
measures of accrual-based earnings management with the Healy model, the DeAngelo model, and the Jones 
model in model (10) to conduct robustness tests. The results are consistent with our hypothesis, confirming the 
robustness of our findings. 
To ensure the reliability of our findings, this paper tests the validity of the model design and the effectiveness of 
instrumental variables. To satisfy the consistency of the GMM estimation, there is no second-order 
autocorrelation between residuals; otherwise, the model would be biased. Table 6 also reports the p-value of the 
residuals’ autocorrelation test AR (2), which indicates that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the 
stochastic error in model (10) has no autocorrelation. Therefore, model (10) makes sense and the estimates are 
effective. The p-value of the Sargan test is greater than 0.1 indicating that we cannot reject the null hypothesis 
that instrumental variables are effective. It confirms that the instrumental variables in this paper are not over-
identified. 
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Table 6. One-step system GMM estimation of the relationship between institutional environment and accrual-
based earnings management 
Variables AEM_Healy AEM_DeAngelo AEM_Jones AEM_CMJones (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
AEMi,t-1 
0.036*** 
(2.951) 
0.194*** 
(5.323) 
0.514*** 
(45.941) 
0.512*** 
(45.708) 
0.028** 
(2.024) 
0.032** 
(2.266) 
0.032** 
(2.411) 
0.031** 
(2.288) 
Govit 
-0.018** 
(-2.456)  
-0.011*** 
(-4.405)  
-0.024*** 
(-9.694)  
-0.020*** 
(-7.872)  
Lawit  
-0.002** 
(-1.954)  
-0.005*** 
(-4.065)  
-0.005*** 
(-4.272)  
-0.005*** 
(-3.854) 
Sizeit 
0.001 
(0.499) 
0.000 
(0.249) 
-0.002* 
(-1.795) 
-0.002 
(-1.435) 
0.004*** 
(3.335) 
0.002 
(1.480) 
0.003** 
(2.145) 
0.001 
(0.762) 
Ageit 
-0.009 
(-0.558) 
-0.013 
(-1.379) 
-0.017 
(-1.357) 
-0.012 
(-1.004) 
0.010 
(0.829) 
-0.012 
(-0.966) 
-0.001 
(-0.119) 
-0.017 
(-1.439) 
CFOit 
-0.015*** 
(-3.992) 
-
0.009*** 
(-3.705) 
-0.009*** 
(-2.731) 
-0.010*** 
(-2.876) 
-0.004 
(-1.242) 
-0.003 
(-0.987) 
-0.004 
(-1.384) 
-0.004 
(-1.170) 
BDSit 
-0.005 
(-0.929) 
0.010*** 
(4.434) 
0.009** 
(2.203) 
0.011*** 
(2.939) 
0.019*** 
(4.962) 
0.010*** 
(2.746) 
0.018*** 
(4.776) 
0.013*** 
(3.125) 
IND
 it 
-0.004 
(-0.247) 
0.022** 
(2.226) 
0.016 
(1.177) 
0.022* 
(1.755) 
0.074*** 
(5.931) 
0.044*** 
(3.631) 
0.073*** 
(5.690) 
0.050*** 
(4.044) 
BSSit 
0.006* 
(1.828) 
0.002 
(1.073) 
0.003 
(1.070) 
0.002 
(0.877) 
0.004 
(0.165) 
0.002 
(0.849) 
0.002 
(0.573) 
0.003 
(1.116) 
H1it 
0.010 
(1.031) 
0.019*** 
(3.025) 
0.038*** 
(4.675) 
0.034*** 
(4.305) 
-0.011 
(-1.135) 
-0.002 
(-0.241) 
0.000 
(0.003) 
0.007 
(0.952) 
Constant -0.173*** (-3.854) 
-0.001 
(-0.071) 
-0.046* 
(-1.647) 
0.009 
(0.329) 
0.128*** 
(4.846) 
0.024 
(0.974) 
0.116*** 
(4.306) 
0.031 
(1.227) 
AR(1)  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AR(2) 0.132 0.127 0.776 0.793 0.387 0.435 0.887 0.919 
Sargan 0.217 0.212 0.518 0.512 0.112 0.198 0.166 0.186 
N 8400 8400 8400 8400 8400 8400 8400 8400 
Notes: This table reports the one-step system GMM estimation of the relationship between institutional 
environment and real earnings management. AEM represents accrual-based earnings management. AEM_Healy, 
AEM_DeAngelo, AEM_Jones, and AEM_CMJones are the absolute value of AEM from the Healy, DeAngelo, 
Jones, and cross-sectional modified Jones models, respectively. Gov is "the relationship between government 
and market" index in the marketization report. Law is "the service level of agencies (lawyers and accountants)" 
index in the marketization report. Size is the natural logarithm of total assets. Age stands for agency costs, 
calculated as management expenses divided by total assets. CFO represents cash flow from operations, 
calculated as net cash flow from operations divided by total assets. BDS is the size of the board of directors, 
computed as the natural logarithm of the number of directors. PID (percentage of independent directors) is the 
ratio of the number of independent directors to all directors. BSS is the size of the board of supervisors, 
computed as the natural logarithm of the number of supervisors. H1 is the ownership proportion of the largest 
shareholder. T-statistics are shown in parentheses below the coefficients. The imbedded program "xtabond2" in 
Stata12.0 is used to do one-step system GMM estimation and the robust option is chosen. The first-order lagged 
dependent variable is the instrumental variable in this paper. AR(1) and AR(2) are used for examining the first-
order and second-order autocorrelation in the GMM estimation. Sargan is used for testing whether the 
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instrumental variable is over-identified. ***, **, and * represent the significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. Two-tailed test. 
 
6.5 Institutional environment vs. real earnings management 
Table 7 reports results of the relationship between institutional environment and real earnings management. For 
example, taking the total real earnings management level (REM_PROXY) as a dependent variable, the 
relationship between institutional environment and real earnings management is significantly positive. 
Government intervention has a significant positive relationship with total real earnings management 
(REM_PROXY) at the one percent (1%) level. This means that the extent of real earnings management is higher 
in firms facing lower government intervention, which is consistent with hypothesis 2a. Legislation also has a 
significant positive relationship with total real earnings management (REM_PROXY) at the one percent (1%) 
level, indicating that the extent of real earnings management is higher in firms located in regions with a higher 
legislation level. This is consistent with hypothesis 2b. Moreover, results from the one-step system GMM 
estimates using the three other proxies for real earnings management are also consistent with our hypotheses. 
Institutional environment has a negative impact on the real earnings management manipulated in sales 
(REM_CFO) and expenditures (REM_DISEXP) at the one percent (1%) significance level9. It positively impacts 
the real earnings management by production manipulation, but is insignificant. The results generally confirm our 
hypothesis 2. The AR (2) and Sargan tests are applied to test the rationality of modeling and the validity of the 
instrumental variables. From the results reported in Table 7, we can see that model (11) is logical and the 
instrumental variables are not over-identified, indicating the reliability of our conclusions. 
Combining the findings from Table 6, we find that institutional environment plays an important role in the 
earnings management policy decisions in listed companies. In the regions with a better institutional environment, 
real earnings management is preferable to accrual-based earnings management. In China, accrual-based earnings 
management is more likely to be identified and eliminated with improved regulations and laws, stronger market 
supervision, and more competent investors. This will force firms with earnings management incentives into 
changing their means. With the improvement in the institutional environment, more real earnings management 
will be implemented to achieve a certain earnings expectation. This switch of earnings management in China is 
in line with the argument of Cohen et al. (2008). Although there are no regulations or laws like SOX in the U.S., 
in China, earnings management also experiences the same effects from the improved institutional environment. 
An interesting situation should also be noted. Among the institutional environment factors, the impact of 
government intervention on earnings management is generally greater than legislation level. As a dominant 
option to manage market failure, government intervention is ubiquitous during this particular period of economic 
transition in China and its important impact on earnings management can be explained in two aspects. First, the 
government has the ability and motives to influence corporate earnings management. The government imposes 
its influence on the operation of business enterprises using administrative rules and support policies as it plays an 
important role in the allocation of market resources. For example, the government is involved in earnings 
management in listed companies through tax preferences and financial subsidies (Chen and Li, 2001) and it is 
difficult for a judge to extricate government intervention when there is litigation (Glaeser et al., 2004), which 
shows how outrageous the intervention can be. Moreover, the number of listed companies under the 
government’s direct watch is a key factor. To reduce the probability of a company being desisted, the 
government has incentives to participate in earnings management in listed companies. In addition, the vulnerable 
legal system in China is also a reason for the impact of government intervention on earnings management. Allen 
et al. (2005) argue that the total number of registered lawyers in China is roughly the same as that in California 
in the U.S. This indicates the defective construction of the legal system in China, especially the absence of laws 
in investor protection, and thus, the legal system is ineffective under the strong administrative power of the 
government. 
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Table 7. One-step system GMM estimation of the relationship between institutional environment and real 
earnings management 
Variables REM_PROXY REM_CFO REM_PROD REM_DISEXP (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
REMi,t-1 0.008 0.010 0.074*** 0.058*** 0.012 0.013 0.697*** 0.696*** 
(0.697) (0.816) (7.765) (6.311) (1.035) (1.153) (70.736) (70.373) 
Govit 0.096**  -0.030***  0.073  -0.008***  
(2.565)  (-6.876)  (1.379)  (-2.579)  
Lawit  0.060***  -0.009***  0.025  -0.006*** 
 (2.778)  (-4.011)  (0.947)  (-3.3430) 
Sizeit 0.026** 0.027** 0.002* 0.002 0.032*** 0.037*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 
(2.202) (2.370) (1.897) (0.203) (12.591) (3.181) (5.738) (6.055) 
Ageit 0.630*** 0.626*** 0.026** 0.009 0.777*** 0.812*** 0.077*** 0.079*** 
(5.418) (5.400) (2.132) (0.735) (6.377) (6.945) (11.380) (11.677) 
CFOit -0.044 -0.050 0.014*** 0.015*** -0.024 -0.027 0.001 0.002 
(-1.470) (-1.631) (4.543) (5.035) (-0.794) (-0.904) (0.840) (1.059) 
BDSit -0.099*** -0.088** 0.016*** 0.009** -0.075* -0.058 0.004 0.003 
(-2.674) (-2.489) (4.247) (2.525) (-1.899) (-1.616) (1.595) (1.608) 
PIDit -0.199 -0.174 0.032** 0.009 -0.151 -0.099 0.014* 0.016** 
(-1.518) (-1.429) (2.436) (0.748) (-1.291) (-0.804) (1.865) (2.129) 
BSSit 0.001 -0.002 -0.006** -0.004* -0.014 -0.019 -0.002 -0.002 
(0.028) (-0.085) (-2.445) (-1.674) (-0.552) (-0.745) (-1.416) (-1.394) 
H1it -0.157** -0.177** 0.007 0.018** -0.176** -0.200*** -0.024*** -0.022*** 
(-2.073) (-2.388) (0.927) (2.355) (-2.282) (-2.709) (-5.380) (-5.300) 
Constant -1.097*** -0.660*** 0.163*** 0.024 -1.090*** -0.753*** -0.032 -0.066*** 
(-3.790) (-2.761) (5.209) (1.016) (-3.148) (-3.157) (-1.615) (-4.874) 
AR(1) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AR(2) 0.551 0.974 0.072 0.140 0.269 0.214 0.133 0.124 
Sargan 0.165 0.158 0.121 0.137 0.788 0.789 0.214 0.210 
N 8400 8400 8400 8400 8400 8400 8400 8400 
Notes: This table reports the one-step system GMM estimation of the relationship between institutional 
environment and accrual-based earnings management. REM represents real earnings management. T-statistics 
are shown in parentheses below the coefficients. The imbedded program "xtabond2" in Stata12.0 is used to do 
one-step system GMM estimation and the robust option is chosen. The first-order lagged dependent variable is 
the instrumental variable in this paper. AR(1) and AR(2) are used for examining the first-order and second-order 
autocorrelation in the GMM estimation. Sargan is used for testing whether the instrumental variable is over-
identified. ***, **, and * represent the significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Two-tailed test. 
 
6.6 Empirical analysis on the transformation of earnings management strategy in Chinese listed companies 
Table 8 shows the estimates of one-step system GMM for analyzing the transformation of earnings management 
strategy in Chinese listed companies. A significant and positive relationship between institutional environment 
and the difference between the two types of earnings management can be found in Table 8. Taking the empirical 
results for the difference between total real earnings management and accrual-based earnings management 
calculated by the cross-sectional modified Jones model as an example (23rd and 24th columns), there is a 
significant positive relationship between the level of government intervention and the difference between the two 
types of earnings management (REM—AEM_CMJones) at the 1% significance level, with the coefficient of 
0.164. There is also a significant positive relationship between the level of legislation and the difference between 
the two types of earnings management (REM—AEM_CMJones) at the 1% significance level, with the coefficient 
of 0.036. It can be seen that the improvement of the institutional environment, the reduction in government 
interventions, and the rise in legislation results in the increasing widening of the difference between the two 
types of earnings management. Alternatively, the constantly improving institutional environment forces listed 
companies to apply real earnings management instead of accrual-based earnings management, which is 
consistent with hypothesis 3. With the improvement of the institutional environment, the possibility of accrual-
based earnings management happening will further be squeezed as it is more verifiable to regulators due to the 
enhanced market supervision and the strengthened ability of investors to identify it. All listed companies have 
incentives to manage earnings and are forced to change their approaches to adjust earnings. They will do more 
real earnings management and apply less accrual-based earnings management. This conversion is the optimal 
choice for the listed companies in a particular institutional environment. The conversion of earnings management 
strategy in Chinese listed companies also confirms the argument in Cohen et al. (2008). Although China lacks 
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legislation similar to SOX in the U.S., the same economic consequences due to the influence of SOX on earnings 
management will exist in China as a result of the improved institutional environment. 
 
Table 8. One-step system GMM estimation of the earnings management strategy evolution in Chinese listed 
companies 
Variables REM－AEM_Healy REM—AEM_DeAngelo REM－AEM_Jones REM－AEM_CMJones 
(17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) 
REMi,t-1－AEMi,t-1 
-0.007 
(-0.635 
-0.005 
(-0.432) 
-0.003 
(-0.285) 
-0.002 
(-0.142) 
0.008 
(0.654) 
0.010 
(0.898) 
0.667 
(0.586) 
0.010 
(0.854) 
Govit 
0.125*** 
(2.878)  
0.089** 
(2.033)  
0.147*** 
(3.182)  
0.164*** 
(3.607)  
Lawit  
0.040** 
(2.041)  
0.023 
(1.296)  
0.030* 
(1.749)  
0.036*** 
(2.921) 
Sizeit 
0.023* 
(1.917) 
0.032*** 
(2.826) 
0.028** 
(2.262) 
0.035*** 
(3.057) 
0.019 
(1.533) 
0.032*** 
(2.812 
0.017 
(1.407) 
0.021*** 
(2.737) 
Ageit 
0.586*** 
(4.861) 
0.658*** 
(5.706) 
0.622*** 
(5.146) 
0.685*** 
(6.001) 
0.561*** 
(4.601) 
0.679* 
(5.890) 
0.540*** 
(4.460) 
0.663*** 
(5.772) 
CFOit 
-0.032 
(-1.068) 
-0.037 
(-1.244) 
-0.030 
(-1.003) 
-0.34 
(-1.123) 
-0.037 
(-1.210) 
-0.042 
(-1.401) 
-0.036 
(-1.177) 
-0.042 
(-1.386) 
BDSit 
-0.118*** 
(-3.121) 
-0.088** 
(-2.512) 
-0.110*** 
(-2.904) 
-0.087** 
(-2.479) 
-0.126*** 
(-3.295) 
-0.084** 
(-2.389) 
-0.135*** 
(-3.537) 
-0.090** 
(-2.547) 
PID
 it 
-0.232* 
(-1.827) 
-0.147 
(-1.221) 
-0.200 
(-1.567) 
-0.129 
(-1.084) 
-0.284** 
(-2.206) 
-0.151 
(-1.261) 
-0.317** 
(-2.470) 
-0.175 
(-1.458) 
BSSit 
0.001 
(0.042) 
-0.007 
(-0.287) 
-0.002 
(-0.085) 
-0.009 
(-0.344) 
0.002 
(0.935) 
-0.010 
(-0.385) 
0.003 
(0.102) 
-0.011 
(-0.414) 
H1it 
-0.152** 
(-1.988) 
-0.194*** 
(-2.621) 
-0.192** 
(-2.506) 
-0.224*** 
(-3.021) 
-0.135* 
(-1.752) 
-0.192*** 
(-2.584) 
-0.138* (-
1.792) 
-0.200*** 
(-2.691) 
Constant -1.288*** (-4.162) 
-0.713*** 
(-2.982) 
-1.108*** 
(-3.558) 
-0.696*** 
(-2.912) 
-1.358*** 
(-4.254) 
-0.676*** 
(-2.828) 
-1.433*** 
(-4.507) 
-0.668*** 
(-2.794) 
AR(1) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AR(2) 0.418 0.449 0.320 0.308 0.708 0.785 0.478 0.406 
Sargan 0.326 0.329 0.180 0.138 0.630 0.604 0.214 0.210 
N 8400 8400 8400 8400 8400 8400 8400 8400 
Notes: This table reports the one-step system GMM estimation of the earnings management strategy evolution in 
Chinese listed companies. T-statistics are shown in parentheses below the coefficients. The imbedded program 
"xtabond2" in Stata12.0 is used to do one-step system GMM estimations and the robust option is chosen. The 
first-order lagged dependent variable is the instrumental variable in this paper. AR(1) and AR(2) are used for 
examining the first-order and second-order autocorrelation in the GMM estimation. Sargan is used for testing 
whether the instrumental variable is over-identified. ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% levels, respectively, Two-tailed test. 
 
6.7 Sensitivity tests 
The following sensitivity tests are applied to test the reliability of our results. First, we remove the effect of 
accounting standard changes. The changes in accounting standards have a great influence on corporate earnings 
management. To prevent the effect of implementation of new accounting standards since 2007 on our results, we 
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divide our sample into 2001–2006 and 2007–2012 sub-samples by year, and the results are consistent with our 
previous findings with the full sample. Second, we differentiate directions of earnings management. For accrual-
based earnings management, we have positive and negative earnings management sub-samples, which we 
regress separately, and also get consistent results. Finally, we remove the data selection effect of environmental 
variables. The marketization report by Fan et al. (2011) is the most authoritative source of institutional 
environment data. However, the report updates slowly due to restricted resources and time, which hinders 
development of the research on institutional environment. As this report only covers data from 1997 to 2009, we 
use institutional environment data in 2009 in place of the data for 2010 through 2013. This may ignore the time-
varying effect of institutional environment on our results. We apply two robustness tests to eliminate this effect. 
One is to remove the 2010 through 2013 data and only use 2002–2009 data to do empirical tests, and another is 
to forecast the 2010 and 2013 data by using the average growing rate of the institutional environment during the 
period of 1997–2009. Results from the robustness tests show no significant difference from our previous 
findings. 
 
7. Conclusion 
With a set of dynamic panel data on 700 companies listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges over a 
period of 12 years, this paper uses system GMM estimation to examine the impact of the institutional 
environment on accrual-based earnings management and real earnings management. The findings are: (1) 
institutional environment and accrual-based earnings management have a significant negative relationship, and 
the extent of accrual-based earnings management is lower with less government interventions and a higher level 
of legislation; (2) there is a significant positive relationship between institutional environment and real earnings 
management, and listed companies are more likely to engage in real earnings management when government 
intervention decreases and legislation improves; and (3) institutional environment has a great influence on the 
selection of earnings management strategy. With the improvement of the institutional environment in China, 
more real earnings management, rather than accrual-based earnings management, will be applied in listed 
companies in the country. 
This paper provides a reference and guidance for the capital market supervision departments in China. First, the 
government has to establish an excellent institutional environment for the long-run capital market by improving 
the institutional environment of business and operations, cooperating well with the market to achieve the 
transformation of government functions, and promoting an effective legal system and investor protections. 
Second, regulators should enhance their supervision on the accrual-based earnings management in listed 
companies, minimize it, and improve the quality of financial reporting. Last, but not least, given the 
transformation of earnings management, regulators should also enhance their supervision of the real activities of 
managing earnings to increase the cost of real earnings management, and hence restrain it. 
Compared with existing studies on earnings management, this paper combines the effect of institutional 
environment on both accrual-based and real earnings management and finds that the means of earnings 
management in China are gradually changing from accrual-based to real earnings management. It confirms that 
the argument of Cohen et al. (2008) can also be applied to the emerging Chinese capital market and has great 
theoretical and practical significance. Nonetheless, a few shortcomings exist in this paper. First, earnings 
management is impacted by complicated factors, but this paper only focuses on the effect of the external 
institutional environment of firms and does not take into account other important factors such as internal control, 
characteristics of managers, and stakeholders. These will be taken into account in our future studies. Second, the 
motivation of earnings management is not examined in this paper. Different motivations lead to different choices 
regarding earnings management, and we expect to include this as one of the study areas in our future research on 
earnings management. Third, this paper examines the influence of the institutional environment on accrual-based 
and real earnings management, but does not involve its resultant effect on the capital market. Whether investors 
can effectively identify accrual-based and real earnings management and act rationally will be addressed in our 
future studies.  
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Notes 
Note 1. Reference on Wanfu Biotech Company Ltd on China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) official 
homepage: http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/csrc_en/ 
(http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/csrc_en/newsfacts/release/201311/t20131120_238602.html) 
 
Note 2. The “NERI INDEX of Marketization of China’s Provinces (2011) Report” by Fan et al. (2011) assesses 
the institutional environment in Chinese provinces. The authors find that the institutional environment is 
relatively steady in the provinces during the period between 2002 and 2009. For instance, with regard to the level 
of marketization, 21 regions changed their rankings by three levels during this period, six regions (Jiangxi, 
Xinjiang, Hebei, Anhui, Yunnan, and Shanxi provinces) changed four positions, one region (Guangxi province) 
changed one position, two regions (Hunan and Hainan provinces) changed seven positions, and one region 
(Henan province) changed nine positions. 
Note 3. Relative to the ownership structure, board of directors, information disclosure, and audit systems, the 
external governance environment is a more fundamental institutional background for corporate governance. As 
earnings management in listed companies has little effect on the external governance environment, there is no 
causal relationship between them. 
Note 4. The asset sales and stock repurchase means of real earnings management are not involved in the total 
real earnings management model in this paper for the following two reasons. First, whether disposing of assets 
can be used as a way of real earnings management is uncertain as Zang (2012) did not find any evidence on the 
effect of asset sales on real earnings management. Second, Hribar et al. (2006) argue that stock repurchase is 
used for real earnings management by increasing the earnings per share (EPS). However, due to the complicated 
motivations of stock repurchase, i.e., both market and political motivations (Gong et al., 2008; Shen et al., 2011), 
we cannot extract that part of a stock repurchase aimed at earnings management. 
Note 5. As the control of sales and production has a great influence on the cost of sales and inventory, 
Roychowdhury (2006) establishes the expected production cost model by using the expected sales cost and 
expected inventory models. The sales cost model is a linear function of current sales, while the inventory model 
is a linear function of current sales and the change in one-period lagged sales. 
Note 6. As the residual of the linear model using the current sales to represent the cost of manipulation is small, 
the cost of manipulation is represented as a linear function of one-period lagged sales to avoid the statistical bias 
(Roychowdhury, 2006). 
Note 7. It should be noted that the R&D and advertising costs are also important parts of discretionary costs. 
However, they are excluded from the calculation of discretionary costs in this paper for the following two 
reasons. First, we cannot obtain relevant data and materials as the details of R&D and advertising costs carried 
forward to current profit and loss are not forced disclosures. Second, according to the Chinese accounting 
standards, the financial account of R&D costs should be placed in the sub-account of management expenses, and 
advertising costs should be placed in the sub-account of selling expenses, i.e., most R&D and advertising costs 
have already been included in the management and selling expenses. 
Note 8. Barton and Simko (2002) find that the elasticity of accounting restricts earnings management, and the 
previous level of earnings management has an impact on the current level. 
Note 9. We can find from the total real earnings management model that total real earnings management is 
negatively related to the real earnings management manipulated by sales and expenditures.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
